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WHEN ANIMALS INVADE AND OCCUPY: PHYSICAL

TAKINGS AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
Rebecca E. Harrison
Abstract: Government actions implementing the Endangered Species Act (ESA) on
private lands have sparked extensive debate and litigation over whether such actions result in
Fifth Amendment takings. To date, courts have uniformly rejected regulatory takings claims
under the ESA, leading several landowners to advance a different theory-physical takings
claims. Successful physical takings claims require landowners to show that government
actions resulted in either per se physical takings or compensable physical invasions of their
land. In two recent decisions, Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States and Seiber v. United
States, courts rejected per se physical takings claims under the ESA, finding that listed
species are not controlled by the government, and the presence of such species on private
land does not destroy all of a landowner's fundamental property rights. The second type of
physical takings, compensable physical invasions, arises when a government action limits a
landowner's right to exclude but leaves other property rights intact. To determine if such an
invasion is a taking, a court would likely employ the three-factor test the United States
Supreme Court presented in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City and weigh
the character of the government action, the effect of the action on the landowner's reasonable
investment-backed expectations, and the economic effect of the action on the landowner.
This Comment argues that government actions taken under the ESA to protect listed species
on private lands do not give rise to compensable physical invasions.

Property rights organizations and private landowners have advanced
two arguments for the proposition that the federal government should
compensate landowners for restrictions it imposes on land pursuant to
the Endangered Species Act (ESA or "the Act").' The first argument is
that these restrictions result in regulatory takings under the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.2 Regulatory takings occur
when government regulations go "too far" in placing restrictions on
private property.3 Courts have steadfastly rejected this argument4
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000); see also, e.g., Harold Johnson, Pacific Legal Foundation, The
Endangered Species Act Threatens Our Environment and Property Rights, at
http://www.pacificlegal.org/view-Commentaries.asp?iID=49&sTite=The+Endangered+Species+A
ct+Threatens+Our+Environment+and+Property+Rights (last visited June 15, 2003) (arguing that the
ESA improperly impinges on private property rights).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.").
3. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (stating the guiding principle behind
regulatory takings as follows: "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking"). The United States Supreme Court has established
two tests courts use to determine whether a specific regulation passes this threshold; see infra notes
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because the claims either (1) lack ripeness,5 (2) challenge actions
affecting only a portion of the property,6 or (3) stem from a landowner's
improper investment-backed expectations for the land.7
The second argument private landowners have advanced is that
government actions under the ESA give rise to physical takings. 8 These
claims avoid several of the roadblocks that prevent landowners with
regulatory takings claims from receiving relief. Specifically, the claims
have a lower threshold for ripeness 9 and can be brought regardless of
whether the government action affects the landowner's entire parcel. 10
Such claims have met with some success in the courts. 1'
To bring a successful physical takings claim a landowner must show
that a government action resulted in either a permanent physical
occupation-a per se physical takingE12-or a compensable physical
invasion. 13 A per se physical taking occurs when the government, or an
entity authorized by the government, occupies private land 4 and
destroys all of the landowner's fundamental property rights. 15 These
rights include the rights to possess the land, exclude others from
possessing and using it, control its use, and dispose of it.' 6 A

118-24 and accompanying text.
4. See Melinda Harm Benson, The Tulare Case: Water Rights, The Endangered Species Act, and
the Fifth Amendment, 32 ENVTL. L. 551, 552-53 (2002).
5. See, e.g., Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 1484 (2003); Seiber v. United States, 53 Fed. Cl. 570, 574-75 (2002).
6. See Robert Meltz, Where the Wild Things Are: The Endangered Species Act and Private
Property, 24 ENVTL. L. 369, 385 (1994).
7. See Glenn P. Sugameli, The ESA and Takings of Private Property, in ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES 441,446-47 (Donald C. Baur & William Robert Irvin eds.,
2002); Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1361-63 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
8. See, e.g., Boise, 296 F.3d at 1342-43; Seiber, 53 Fed. Cl. at 575-76; Boise Cascade Corp. v.
Or. State Bd. of Forestry, 991 P.2d 563, 569-70 (Or. Ct. App. 1999); see also Eric Grant,
Endangered Species, Habitat Preservation, and Just Compensation: Why Habitat-Preserving
Regulations are Permanent Physical Occupations of Private Property, SF64 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 729, 733
(May 2001).
9. See Grant, supra note 8, at 733.
10. See id. at 734.
11. See, e.g., Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 318-19
(2001) (finding ESA-based restrictions on the use of a water right caused a per se physical taking).
12. See infra Part 11.
13. See infra Part 11.
14. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,432-33 n.9 (1982).
15. Seeid at435.
16. Seeid at 435-36.

Physical Takings and the ESA
compensable physical invasion, on the other hand, stems from a
government action that causes a temporary or intermittent invasion of
private land. 7 During the invasion, the landowner's right to exclude is
limited, but18 his or her other fundamental property rights are left
unimpaired.
To date, courts have only considered whether government
implementation of the ESA amounts to a per se physical taking.' 9 In two
recent decisions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit and the United States Court of Federal Claims rejected such
claims. 20 Both courts reasoned that government actions under the ESA
resulting in the presence of protected species on private land neither
provide for a government presence on private land nor divest a
landowner of all of his or her fundamental property rights.2' These
actions, therefore, are not per se physical takings.
Courts have not addressed whether a government action under the
ESA may give rise to a compensable physical invasion. Given the
systematic tenacity of some landowners and property rights
organizations,2 2 there can be little doubt that courts soon will face such a
claim. When landowners bring this claim, it is likely that a court will
apply the United States Supreme Court's three-factor balancing test
introduced in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.23 The
Court has stated, in dicta, that courts should apply the Penn Centraltest
to claims of compensable physical invasions.24 This test requires courts
to consider the character of the action, the effect of the action on the
landowner's reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the
action's economic impact on the landowner.2 5
17. See id at 435 n.12.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 1484 (2003); Seiber v. United States, 53 Fed. Cl. 570, 575-76 (2002); Boise
Cascade Corp. v. Or. State Bd. of Forestry, 991 P.2d 563, 569-70 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).
20. Boise, 296 F.3d at 1352; Seiber, 53 Fed. Cl. at 576.
21. See Boise, 296 F.3d at 1354-55; Seiber, 53 Fed. Cl. at 575-76.
22. See, e.g., Boise, 296 F.3d 1339; Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49
Fed. Cl. 313 (2001); State v. Sour Mt. Realty, Inc., 17 N.Y.S.2d 78 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000); Good v.
United States, 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Moerman v. California, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1993).
23. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
24. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432, 435 n.12 (1982)
(discussing Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124).
25. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124.
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This Comment argues that government actions implementing the ESA
on private land do not amount to compensable physical invasions for
two reasons. First, background principles of property law require private
landowners to allow for government efforts to protect wildlife on their
land.26 The enforcement of preexisting restrictions on title to property is
never a taking. 27 Second, application of the Penn Central balancing test
strongly suggests that courts should reject claims arguing that ESA
restrictions amount to compensable physical invasions.28 Legal
precedent and statutory safeguards in the ESA are likely to require
that
29
affected landowners not receive compensation for these claims.
Part I of this Comment presents relevant sections of the ESA
controlling its application to private land. Part II explains regulatory
takings, per se physical takings, and compensable physical invasions.
Part III discusses the obstacles facing ESA-based regulatory takings
claims. Part IV presents per se physical takings claims under the Act,
explains how these claims avoid several of the roadblocks faced by
regulatory takings claims, and discusses courts' rationale for rejecting
such claims. Part V discusses compensable physical invasion takings
claims and outlines the three-factor test courts may use to determine if a
compensable taking is present. Finally, Part VI argues that preexisting
limitations on property use, precedent, and statutory safeguards in the
ESA strongly suggest that courts should reject compensable physical
invasion claims under the Act.
I.

THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY RIGHTS

The purpose of the ESA is to recover populations of imperiled species
and conserve the ecosystems upon which such species depend.30 Many
imperiled species occupy and depend on private land. 3 1 To meet its goal,
the Act provides the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the

26. See infra Part VI.B.
27. See infra Part 11.
28. See infra Part VI.C.
29. See infra Part VI.C.

30. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000).
31. See David S. Wilcove et al., Rebuilding the Ark: Toward a More Effective Endangered
Species
Act
for
Private
Land,
at

http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/483_Rebuilding%20the%20Ark%2Ehtm
1996).

(Dec. 5,

Physical Takings and the ESA
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries Service
(NOAA Fisheries) with the authority to regulate actions on private lands
that may harm imperiled species or their habitat. 32 In order to exercise
this authority, the FWS and NOAA Fisheries (collectively, "the
Services") must list a species as "endangered" or "threatened. 3 3 An
endangered species is "any species which is in danger of extinction
throughout all or a significant portion of its range. 34 A threatened
species is "any species which is likely to become an endangered species
within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its
range." 35 The Act provides listed species with two protections on private
land. 36 First, it is illegal for a private landowner to harm a listed species
or its habitat. 37 Second, the federal government may not authorize, fund,
or carry out actions on private land that may jeopardize the continued
existence of the listed species or its habitat. 38 To lessen the burden of
these restrictions, the Act provides two means by which landowners can
mitigate the effects of a listing on their land-commenting
on proposed
39 and applying for Incidental Take Permits (ITPs). 40
rules
A.

Private Land and the ESA

To meet the goals of the ESA, it is critical for the Services to provide
protection for species on private land.4 1 Habitat loss is the primary cause
of wildlife endangerment, 42 and more than half of all species listed as
endangered inhabit private lands.43 Furthermore, as of 1994, at least
32. See infra Part I.B.
33. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533, 1536(a)(2), 1538(a)(1).
34. Id. § 1532(6).
35. Id. § 1532(20).
36. See Meltz, supra note 6, at 373-76.
37. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a).
38. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
39. See id § 1533(b)(3)(B)(ii), (b)(5)(AHE); see also U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, LISTING
A SPECIES AS THREATENED OR ENDANGERED: SECTION 4 OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 2, at
http://endangered.fws.gov/listing/listing.pdf (Feb. 2001) [hereinafter LISTING ASPECIES].
40. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
41. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, OUR ENDANGERED SPECIES PROGRAM AND HOW IT
WORKS WITH LANDOWNERS 1, at http://endangered.fws.gov/landowner/landown.pdf (June 2002)
[hereinafter ENDANGERED SPECIES PROGRAM].

42. Wilcove et al., supranote 31.
43. Oliver A. Houck, Why Do We Protect EndangeredSpecies, and What Does That Say About
Whether Restrictions on Private Propertyto Protect Them Constitute "'Takings"?, 80 IOWA L. REV.
297, 319 (1995).
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eighty percent of the habitat for over half of all listed species was
located on non-federal land, which includes private, tribal, and stateowned land. 4 Private lands therefore play an important role in providing
for successful species recovery efforts under the ESA.45
Before the FWS or NOAA Fisheries can provide protection for
imperiled species on private land, they must list the species as
endangered46 or threatened. 7 Section 448 of the Act requires the Services
to decide whether to list a species as threatened or endangered "solely on
the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available. 49 When a
species is listed, the Services must designate its "critical habitat" when
doing so is "prudent and determinable." 50 "Critical habitat" includes
areas within the region the species occupied at the time it was listed that
contain "physical or biological features (I) essential to the conservation
of the species and (II) which may require special management
considerations or protection.",5 1 It also encompasses certain areas outside
the region the species occupied at the time it was listed that "are
essential for the conservation of the species."52 The establishment of
critical habitat is to be based on both scientific data and potential
economic impact. 53 Critical habitat may include private as well as public
land. 54 It is intended to encompass areas "within the geographical area
occupied by the species, 5 5 as well as lands "essential for the
conservation of the species" that are not currently occupied.56
44. Wilcove etal., supra note 31.
45. See ENDANGERED SPECIES PROGRAM, supra note 41, at 1.

46. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2000); see also supranote 34 and accompanying text.
47, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20); see also supra note 35 and accompanying text.
48, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(aHi).
49, Id. § 1533(b)(1)(A). Pursuant to § 1533(a)(1), factors the Services must consider in making
listing determinations include:
(A) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of [the species']
habitat or range;
(B) overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational purposes;
(C) disease or predation;
(D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or
(E) other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued existence.
50. Id.§ 1533(a)(3).
51. Id. § 1532(5)(A)(i).
52. Id.§ 1532(5)(A)(ii).
53. Id.§ 1533(b)(2).
54. See id.§ 1532(5)(A).
55. Id.§ 1532(5)(A)(i).
56. Id.§ 1532(5)(A)(ii).

Physical Takings and the ESA
The first protection the ESA provides for a listed species is to prohibit
people or agencies from effecting a "take" of the species on public and
private land.57 "Take" means to "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such
conduct. 5 8 This restriction, provided for in Section 9 of the Act,59
reaches beyond injury inflicted directly on an individual ' 60animal; it also
includes "significant habitat modification or degradation.
The ESA also provides protection for listed species and habitat on
private land through the Section 76 1consultation requirement.62 This
provision requires that every federal agency consult with either the FWS
or NOAA Fisheries to ensure actions they authorize, fund, or carry out
will be unlikely to either "jeopardize the continued existence of any
[listed] species' ' 63 or "result in the destruction or adverse modification of
[critical] habitat., 64 Private landowners who undertake projects that
require a federal agency's funds, authorization, or participation, and are
likely to affect listed species or critical habitat, are subject to the
consultation requirement.6 5
B.

PrivateLandowners Can Use Two Means to Influence the ESA's
Application to Their Land

While the ESA places restrictions on the use of private land, it also
provides two means by which private landowners can influence the
Act's application to their land. First, Section 4 grants the public notice of
and an opportunity to comment on proposed rules to list species and
designate critical habitat. 66 Second, Section 1067 gives landowners the

57. Id. § 1538(a)(l)(B).
58. Id. § 1532(19).
59. Id. § 1538(a)-(g).
60. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2000).
61. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)-(p).
62. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id. § 1536(a)(2)-(3).
66. See id. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(ii).
67. See id. § 1539(a)-j).
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opportunity to receive ITPs. 68 These permits allow landowners to take

69
listed species or species habitat under certain conditions.
Section 4 of the ESA provides landowners with an opportunity to

learn about, comment on, and provide additional information regarding

proposed listings and critical habitat designations.70 The Section requires
the Services to notify the public of proposed rules listing species and
designating critical habitat, 71 and provides an opportunity for the public

to comment. 72 This process ensures that a landowner who may be
affected by the listing of a species will know in advance that the species
is proposed for listing.73 Landowners therefore have an opportunity to

voice their concerns about the listing and provide additional information
74

that may inform the Services' final decision.
Once a species is listed, a landowner may avoid the Act's prohibitions
on the take of the species by applying for and receiving an ITP.75 These
permits grant landowners permission to take listed species or species
habitat. 76 In order to receive an ITP, a landowner must submit an
acceptable habitat conservation plan (HCP). v7 The FWS or NOAA
Fisheries must then find that the landowner's proposed taking is
incidental to, and not the purpose of, his or her proposed action. 8 ITPs

may be granted for a variety of activities on non-federal lands such as
logging, clearing land, and development. 79

68. See id. § 1539(a)(l)(B).
69. See id.
70. See id. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(ii), (b)(5)(A)-(E); see also LISTING A SPECIES,supra note 39, at 2.
71. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(ii), (b)(5)(A)-(E); see also LISTING A SPECIES, supra note 39, at 2.
72. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(ii); see also LISTING A SPECIES, supra note 39, at 2.
73. See LISTING A SPECIES, supra note 39, at 2.

74. Id.
75. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(l)(B).
76. See id.
77. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A). Pursuant to § 1539(a)(2)(A), HCPs must specify:
(i) the impact which will likely result from such taking;
(ii) what steps the applicant will take to minimize and mitigate such impacts, and the funding
that will be available to implement such steps;
(iii) what alternative actions to such taking the applicant considered and the reasons why
such alternatives are not being utilized; and
(iv) such other measures that the Secretary may require as being necessary or appropriate for
purposes of the plan.
78. Id. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
79. See Marj Nelson, Habitat Conservation Planning, ENDANGERED SPECIES BULLETIN 12, at
http://endangered.fws.gov/esb/99/11-12/12-13.pdf (Nov.-Dec. 1999).

Physical Takings and the ESA
1I.

REGULATORY TAKINGS, PER SE PHYSICAL TAKINGS,
AND COMPENSABLE PHYSICAL INVASIONS

The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that private
property may not be taken for public use without just compensation.8"
The Takings Clause was designed to prevent the government from
instituting an action or regulation that forces a few individuals "to bear
the public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole.",81 A landowner affected by such an action may
seek compensation through a regulatory takings claim, a physical takings
claim, or both.82 There are two types of physical takings claims: per se
physical takings and compensable physical invasions. 83 The
requirements for bringing a successful takings claim vary depending on
the type of claim asserted.8 4 There is one principle, however, that applies
to all claims: laws that simply repeat or enforce preexisting limitations
on a landowner's title do not cause a taking.8 5
There are two categories of takings for which landowners may seek
compensation: regulatory and physical. 6 In general, regulatory takings
arise out of government regulations that, when applied to private land,
unfairly reduce or eliminate the land's economic value or use. Physical
takings, on the other hand, occur when the government, or something the
government sets 88in motion or authorizes, physically enters and occupies
private property.
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized two types of physical
takings: per se physical takings and compensable physical invasions. 89
Per se physical takings claims stem from the permanent physical
occupation of private land by either the government or an entity

80. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
81. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
82. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 425-40 (1982).

83. See id.
at 434-35; ROBERT MELTZ ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON
LAND-USE CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 571 (1999).
84. See infra Parts II.B, IV.B, V.B.

85. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028-29 (1992).
86. See, e.g., Loretto, 458 U.S. at 425-40.
87. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (stating the guiding principle behind
regulatory takings as follows: "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking").
88. See MELTZ ET AL., supra note 83, at 117.
89. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35; MELTZ ET AL., supranote 83, at 571.
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authorized by the government. 90 An occupation of this kind requires
compensation because it destroys all of a landowner's basic property
rights. 9 1 These include the rights to possess the land or exclude others
92
from possessing and using it, control its use, and dispose of it.
Compensable physical invasions result from a temporary or
intermittent invasion of private property caused by a government
action. 93 These invasions limit a landowner's right to exclude, but the
landowner retains some or all of the other basic property rights.94
Namely, the landowner may still possess the land, exclude others from
possessing and using it, and control its use and disposal.95
The U.S. Supreme Court has developed different tests to determine
whether a landowner has suffered a regulatory taking, 96 aperse physical
taking,97 or a compensable physical invasion.98 In spite of these
differences, there is one principle courts apply to all takings claims: laws
that merely repeat or enforce preexisting limitations on a landowner's
title do not cause a taking. 99 These limitations stem from state property
and nuisance law. 100 This rule, announced in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council,'0 ' recognizes that government actions do not deprive
landowners of any rights simply by articulating or implementing
limitations on the use of private land that applied to the land prior to
private ownership.'0° Such actions therefore do not require
3
compensation.1

90. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426, 432-33 n.9.

91. See id. at 435-36.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 435 n.12.
94. See id.
95. See id.

96. See infra Part III.B.
97. See infra Part IV.B.
98. See infra Part V.B.

99. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028-29 (1992).
100. Id. at 1029.
101. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).

102. See id at 1028-29; see also Benson, supra note 4, at 582.
103. See Benson, supranote 4, at 582.

Physical Takings and the ESA

III.

REGULATORY TAKINGS CLAIMS UNDER THE ESA

Landowners affected by the ESA have argued that restrictions the
Services impose on their property to protect listed species result in
regulatory takings.' 0 4 To date, such claims have failed. 10 5 There are two
main reasons for this record. First, regulatory takings claims must meet
an exacting ripeness standard. 10 6 Claims stemming from the ESA often
do not meet this standard and therefore are dismissed without
adjudication on the merits.' 0 7 Second, these claims generally fail the two
U.S. Supreme Court tests to determine whether a given regulation
requires compensation.' 0 8
A.

Regulatory Takings Claims Under the ESA Often Fail the U.S.
Supreme Court'sExacting Ripeness Standard

Before a court determines whether a regulatory takings claim has
merit, it must conclude that the claim is ripe for review. 10 9 For a court to
draw this conclusion, it must find that the government agency
implementing the regulation has rendered a final action. 110 One factor
courts consider in determining the finality of a challenged agency action
is whether the landowner has exhausted all available administrative
remedies and exceptions to the regulation."' Courts have established
one exception to the finality requirement: the futility doctrine." 12 Under
this doctrine, a court will find a regulatory takings claim to be ripe for
review if it would
be futile for the landowner to pursue further agency
13
action or relief."

104. See, e.g., Moerman v. California, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329, 334 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
105. See Benson, supranote 4, at 552-53.
106. See MELTZ ET AL., supranote 83, at 45-46.

107. See, e.g., Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 1484 (2003) (finding regulatory takings claim was not ripe because the FWS had
not denied the ITP); Seiber v. United States, 53 Fed. C1. 570, 574-75 (2002) (concluding that the
FWS' denial of an incidental take permit, when accompanied by communications indicating a
willingness to consider a modified permit application, was not a final agency action and therefore
the claim was not ripe).
108. See Meltz, supranote 6, at 385-86.
109. See, e.g., Boise, 296 F.3d at 1347; Seiber, 53 Fed. Cl. at 574-75.
110. Williamson County Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985).
111. See id. at 190.
112. See MELTZ ET AL., supranote 83, at 46.
113. Id.
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Regulatory takings claims under the ESA are often based on
intermediate agency actions, rather than final actions," 14 and therefore do
not fulfill the ripeness requirement. In the case of a claim under the
ESA, the finality requirement usually means that the landowner must
have applied for and been denied an ITP. 115 To satisfy the exhaustion of
remedies factor, the landowner must then submit a revised ITP
application, if doing so would not be futile, and have that application
denied. 16 Courts have repeatedly rejected regulatory takings claims
under the ESA brought by landowners who have not completed this
process. 1 7
B.

Regulatory Takings Claims Fail the U.S. Supreme Court's Two
Tests to Determine Whether a Government Regulation Requires
Compensation

If a regulatory takings claim satisfies the ripeness requirement, a court
must then decide it on the merits. To determine whether a government
regulation has gone "too far,"' 18 thereby requiring compensation, a court
undertakes an ad hoc factual inquiry." 9 There are two different tests a
court uses to inform this inquiry. 120 Under the first test, announced in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, a court determines whether
the regulation has deprived the landowner's property of its entire value
or use.' 2' If it has, a per se regulatory taking has occurred, and the
government must compensate the landowner. 2 2 But, if the property
retains some usefulness or value, then a court must undertake the second
test and weigh three factors to determine whether the regulation requires
compensation. 123 These factors, announced in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City, include the character of the
government's action, its effect on the landowner's reasonable
H14.

See, e.g., Boise, 296 F.3d at 1347; Seiber, 53 Fed. CI. at 575-76.

115. See Boise, 296 F.3d at 1349 (noting that extraordinary delay or bad faith on the part of an
agency in considering an ITP application can make a claim ripe without a final agency action).
116. See id at 1347; Seiber, 53 Fed. Cl. at 574-75; see also Meltz, supranote 6, at 386-87.
117. See, e.g., Boise, 296 F.3d at 1347; Seiber, 53 Fed. Cl. at 574-75.
118. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
119. See id.
at415-16.
120. See Benson, supra note 4, at 581-82.
121. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
122. Id.

123. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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investment-backed expectations, and its economic impact on the
landowner. 124 In its most recent decision on the merits of a regulatory
takings claim under the ESA, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit based its decision on only one of these
factors-the landowner's
25
reasonable investment-backed expectations.
Landowners' claims asserting that ESA restrictions agencies place on
their property give rise to regulatory takings generally fail both tests of
the regulatory takings analysis. These claims fail the first test because
ESA regulations usually affect some, but not all, of the value or use of a
parcel of private land. 26 For example, if the Services designate a
landowner's entire acreage as critical habitat, he or she is not
automatically prohibited from using the land to hunt and fish for animals
other than the listed species. 127 If the regulations do not eliminate the
entire value or use, the landowner has not suffered a per se regulatory
taking. 128
Regulatory takings claims under the ESA generally fail the second
test of the regulatory takings analysis because they are not based on
reasonable investment-backed expectations. 129 The term "investmentbacked expectations" is derived from a law review article 30 defining it
as the crystallized expectations a landowner holds for the continued use
of his or her land in a certain manner.' 3' Because the U.S. Supreme
Court itself has not defined the term, however, it is unclear how lower
courts should apply this factor.' 32 In Good v. United States, 133 the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit applied the factor to a regulatory
takings claim under the ESA. 134 The court determined that a landowner
who, at the time of purchase, had actual and constructive knowledge of

124. See id.
All three factors are discussed in detail in Part V.B.
125. See Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1360-63 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
126. Meltz, supra note 6, at 385.
127. See Sugameli, supra note 7, at 450.

128. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
129. See Sugameli, supra note 7, at 447.
130. MELTZ ET AL., supra note 83, at 134.
131. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the EthicalFoundations
of "Just Compensation Law, " 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1233 (1967).

132. See, e.g., MELTZ ET AL., supra note 83, at 133-34; Blaine I. Green, The EndangeredSpecies
Act and Fifth Amendment Takings: ConstitutionalLimits of Species Protection, 15 YALE J. ON REG.

329, 358 (1998).
133. 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
134. Id. at 1360-63.
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the Act's potential application to his land, did not have the investment1 35
backed expectations necessary to satisfy regulatory takings claims.
Thus, to satisfy the second step in the regulatory takings test, landowners
must have had no knowledge
at the time of purchase that the ESA may
36
apply to their land.
IV. PER SE PHYSICAL TAKINGS UNDER THE ESA
Faced with courts' consistent rejection of regulatory takings claims
under the ESA, landowners have tried a different approach: asserting
that government actions to protect listed species result in per se physical
takings. 37 Per se physical takings occur when the government, or an
entity authorized by the government, permanently occupies private
land.'
Claims asserting per se physical takings avoid the major
roadblocks faced by regulatory taking claims: ripeness, 39 the
extensiveness of the injury to the landowner, 140 and the landowner's
reasonable investment-backed expectations.' 4' In spite of these
distinctions, per se physical
takings claims have not met with much
42
success in the courts. 1
In fact, courts have rejected such claims in two recent decisions:
144
43
Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States' and Seiber v. United States.
In Boise, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that
the government does not control the location of wild animals and
135. Id. at 1362.
136. Id. The court did not articulate a general principle for what constitutes "knowledge." It did
conclude, however, that the claimant's acknowledgement of the necessity and difficulty of obtaining
regulatory approval for the development, and the language in the sales contract recognizing
potential problems with obtaining federal permission to develop the land, amounted to adequate
"knowledge" that the ESA could be applied to the land. Id.
137. See, e.g., Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1484 (2003); Seiber v. United States, 53 Fed. Cl. 570, 575-76 (2002); Boise
Cascade Corp. v. Or. State Bd. of Forestry, 991 P.2d 563, 569-70 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).
138. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432-33 n.9, 435-36
(1982).
139. See Grant, supra note 8, at 733.
140. Id.
141. See Sugameli, supra note 7, at 447.
142. See infra Part IV.C. But cf Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed.
Cl. 313, 318-19 (2001) (finding ESA-based restrictions on the use of a water right caused a per se
physical taking).
143. 296 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1484 (2003).
144. 53 Fed. Cl. 570 (2002).
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therefore did not cause the listed species to inhabit private land.1 45 This
rationale is supported by the findings of two older Circuit Court of
Appeals decisions: Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel146 and
Christy v. Hodel147 The court in Seiber, on the other hand, based its
conclusion largely on its finding that the government's actions did
not
48
deprive the landowners of all of their fundamental property rights.
A.

Per Se Physical Takings Claims Under the ESA Avoid the Major
Roadblocks Posed by Regulatory Takings Claims

Landowners who bring per se physical takings claims for government
actions implementing the ESA avoid the major roadblocks faced by
those who bring regulatory takings claims. First, unlike regulatory
takings claims, which are not ripe until the completion of a final agency
action, 149 per se physical takings claims are ripe as soon as the
government, or an entity authorized by the government, enters or
occupies private property.' 50 Proceeding with a per se physical takings
claim therefore allows a landowner to avoid the often costly and
laborious process of applying for an HCP and ITP prior to seeking
compensation from the federal government. 51
Second, landowners asserting per se physical takings claims can
receive compensation for any portion of property the government has
occupied, even if this portion is merely a small fraction of the total
property. 52 On the other hand, a court can order compensation in a
regulatory takings case only if the government action has affected the
entire value or use of the property. 53 Thus, the fact that government
actions under the ESA generally affect only a portion of a parcel of
private land154 does not present a significant barrier to successful per se
physical takings claims under the Act. Finally, courts do not apply the

145. See Boise, 296 F.3d at 1354-55.
146. 799 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1986).
147. 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1988).
148. See Seiber, 53 Fed. CI. at 576.
149. See supraPart III.A.
150. See McKenzie v. City of White Hall, 112 F.3d 313, 317 (8th Cir. 1997) ("[P]hysical taking
is by definition a final decision."); see also Grant, supra note 8, at 733.
151. Grant, supra note 8, at 733.
152. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,438 n.16 (1982).
153. See supranote 121 and accompanying text.
154. See Meltz, supra note 6, at 385-86.
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Penn Central three-factor balancing test to per se physical takings
claims,' 55 so the landowner's reasonable investment-backed expectations
are irrelevant to the success of such claims. 156
B.

Requirements for Per Se Physical Takings

In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,'57 the U.S.
Supreme Court established two requirements for a successful per se
physical takings claim.' 5 8 First, the occupant must be either the
government or an entity authorized by the government. 59 Second, the
occupation must destroy all of the landowner's property rights.' 60 These
rights include the rights to possess the land, exclude others from it,
control the use of the land, and dispose of it. 16 1 The occupation does not
have to destroy the landowner's property rights for his or her entire
parcel of property. 162 Instead, the government must compensate the
landowner for any portion of the property it occupies, regardless of the
size. 63 If the claim fulfills both of these criteria, the landowner has
suffered a per se physical taking, and the government must provide just
compensation. 164
In Loretto, a landlord challenged a New York state law that required
landlords to allow the installation of cable boxes on rental properties so
tenants could access cable television. 65 The landlord brought a class
action against Teleprompter, a cable television company, claiming that
the installation constituted a taking without just compensation. 66 The
Court agreed, reasoning that the government authorized the boxes'

155. See infra Part IV.B.
156. See supra Part I I.B.
157. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).

158. See id at 432-33 n.9, 435-36 & n. 12.
159. Id. at 432-33 n.9.
160. See id.at 435-36 & n.12.

161. Id. at 435-36.
162. Id. at 436-37.
163. See id. at 438 n.16 ("[W]hether the installation is a taking does not depend on whether the
volume of space it occupies is bigger than a breadbox."). But cf id at 437 (noting that a court
should consider the extent of the occupation as one factor in determining the amount of
compensation due).

164. Id.at 426.
165. Id. at 421-24.

166. Id. at 424. The landlord also alleged a trespass against Teleprompter for the installation. Id.
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occupation of the landlord's property, 167 and that this occupation
destroyed all of the landlord's property rights for the portion of land on
which the boxes were installed. 168 The landlord could not possess the
space occupied by the boxes, exclude the boxes, control the use of the
occupied space, or dispose of it. 169 The Court reasoned that because
permanent physical occupations destroy all of these rights, the
government must provide compensation for such occupations, regardless
70
of the size of the area affected or the public purpose served. '71
C.

In Two Recent Cases, Courts Held that Government Actions Under
the ESA Did Not Support Claims of Per Se Physical Takings

In two recent decisions, courts rejected claims that government
actions under the ESA to protect imperiled species give rise to per se
physical takings. 172 Courts in Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States and
Seiber v. United States applied the Loretto test and rejected claims by
private landowners that government actions protecting listed species
resulted in per se physical takings. 73 In Boise, the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit held that the landowner had not suffered a per se
physical taking because the government does not control the location of
wild animals and therefore did not cause the species to inhabit private
land. 174 Furthermore, in Seiber, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims held
that government actions under the ESA did not amount to a per se
physical taking because the government did not deprive the landowners
of all of their property rights. 175 The U.S. Court of Federal Claims hears
all takings claims against the federal government for more than
$10,000.176 Parties can appeal its decisions to the Court of Appeals for
177
the Federal Circuit.
167. Id. at 425-26.
168. Id.
at 438.
169. Id. at 435-36, 438.

170. Id.at 438 n.16. But cf id.at 437 (noting that a court should consider the extent of the
occupation as one factor in determining the amount of compensation due).
171. Id.at426,434-35.
172. See Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert.

denied, 123 S. Ct. 1484 (2003); Seiber v. United States, 53 Fed. CI. 570, 574-76 (2002).
173. See Boise, 296 F.3d at 1354-55; Seiber, 53 Fed. Cl. at 576.

174. See Boise, 296 F.3d at 1354-55.
175. See Seiber, 53 Fed. CI. at 576.
176. Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1994).
177. Id. § 1291; see also MELTZ ET AL., supra note 83, at 43 ("Because few takings cases are
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The Government Does Not Control the Location of Wild Animals
That Are ProtectedUnder FederalStatutes

In Boise, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the
presence of wildlife protected by the ESA on private land does not
constitute a government occupation of private land. 178 This is true
because the government does not control the location of wildlife
protected by the ESA. 179 The Boise case arose from a dispute between
the Boise Cascade Corporation (Boise) and the FWS over the
management of a 65-acre parcel of Boise's land known as the Walker
Creek Unit. 180 This parcel hosted, and contained habitat for, the
federally-listed northern spotted owl.18 1 When Boise attempted to log the
parcel, the FWS conducted an inspection and determined that logging
could harm owls that might otherwise use the site as nesting habitat. 82 It
then notified Boise that the corporation must secure an ITP prior to
logging the parcel. 83 Boise filed suit in federal district court seeking an
injunction preventing the FWS from enforcing the ESA against it and a
declaratory judgment that its logging operation would not take spotted
85
owls.184 The district court dismissed Boise's claim for lack of ripeness
and instead granted the United States' request for an injunction
1 6
preventing the corporation from logging on the site without an ITP. 1
Boise then applied for an ITP. 187 After conducting additional surveys of
the Walker Creek Unit, the FWS determined that spotted owls would not
be taken by the corporation's planned logging activities and informed

appealed from the Federal Circuit to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit has a leading role
in articulating takings law in the many areas where the High Court has not yet spoken.").
178. See Boise, 296 F.3d at 1353-55.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1341.
181. Id. at 1341-42. In 1990, the FWS listed the northern spotted owl as a threatened species
under the ESA. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (current through June 16, 2003). See also Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Threatened Status for the Northern Spotted Owl,
55 Fed. Reg. 26,114, 26,194 (June 26, 1990).
182. Boise, 296 F.3d at 1341-42.
183. Id. at 1342.
184. Id.

185. Id. at 1342 n.3.
186. Id. at 1342.
187. Id.
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the corporation that an ITP was no
longer required. 88 The district court
189
subsequently lifted the injunction.
Boise returned to court, seeking compensation for the temporary
taking of merchantable timber it was prevented from logging because of
the district court's injunction.1 90 One theory Boise presented' 9' was that
the injunction was a per se physical taking under Loretto' 92 because the
corporation was not allowed to exclude spotted owls from its property
by harvesting the94timber. 93 The court dismissed Boise's complaints, and
Boise appealed.

In its decision upholding the dismissal, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit relied on Loretto and concluded that, because
government actions under the ESA merely restrict what landowners can
do with their land once a species has been listed, rather than actually
cause the species to inhabit the land, such actions do not give rise to per
se physical takings.' 95 Boise had argued that Loretto should be applied to
its situation because the "occupation [of its land] by wild spotted owls
[is] indistinguishable from a forced government intrusion upon its
land." 96 In rejecting this argument, the court identified a critical
difference between the two situations. Unlike Loretto, in which the
government regulation in question required the cable boxes to be
installed on private lands, 97 the government actions in Boise
were not
98
responsible for the owls' presence on the corporation's land.'

188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.The other claims included a categorical taking, an exaction-type taking, and a temporary
regulatory taking. Id.at 1342-43.
192. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 425-40 (1982).
193. Boise, 296 F.3d at 1352. Boise also argued that the requirement that it allow government
agents onto its land to conduct owl surveys constituted a compensable physical taking. The court
rejected this claim, finding that under Loretto, "[tiransient, nonexclusive entries by the [FWS] to
conduct owl surveys do not permanently usurp Boise's exclusive right to possess, use, and dispose
of its property." Id.at 1355.
194. Id.at 1343.
195. See id.
at 1354-55.
196. Id.at1354.
197. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at421.
198. See Boise, 296 F.3d at 1354-55 ("The government has no control over where the spotted
owls nest, and it did not force the owls to occupy Boise's land. The government simply imposed a
temporary restriction
on Boise's exploitation of certain natural resources located on its land unless
Boise obtained apermit.").
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Two older cases support the Boise court's conclusion that the
government does not control wildlife protected by federal statute. First,
in Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether damage to private land
caused by wild horses and burros should be compensated as a per se
physical taking. 99 The federal government granted protection to the
animals under the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 200 which
prohibited landowners from removing the animals from private land.20 '
The landowners claimed that because the government did not respond to
their requests for removal of the animals, 20 2 the damage the animals
caused through grazing and erosion should be compensated as a taking
of private property.20 3 In rejecting this claim, the court determined that
the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act did not give the
government ownership of the animals.20 4 The offending horses therefore
were not "instrumentalities of the federal government" 20 5 whose
presence gives rise to a physical taking.20 6
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the Mountain
States court's reasoning to a physical takings claim arising under the
ESA in Christy v. Hodel.20 7 The plaintiff in Christy claimed that by
listing grizzly bears as threatened under the Act, the government made
the bears government agents that physically took his property. 208 The
court rejected this claim, reasoning that the government neither owns nor
controls the conduct of the species it protects. 2 09 Thus, both the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have based their
rejection of per se physical takings claims under the ESA on the
reasoning that the government does not control the location of wild
animals.
199. See Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423, 1424-28 (10th Cir. 1986).
200. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (2000).
201. See Mountain States, 799 F.2d at 1425.

202. Id.
203. Id. at 1425-26.
204. Id. at 1426-27 ("[l1t is pure fantasy to talk of 'owning' wild fish, birds, or animals. Neither
the States nor the Federal Government. ..has title to these creatures until they are reduced to
possession by skillful capture.") (quoting Douglas v. Seacoast Products,Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284

(1977)) (internal quotations omitted) (internal citation omitted).
205. Id.at 1428.
206. Id.
207. 857 F.2d 1324, 1334-35 (9th Cir. 1988).
208. Id. at 1334.
209. Id. at 1335.
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2.

The Presence of a ProtectedSpecies on PrivateLand Does Not
Destroy All of a Landowner'sProperty Rights in the Inhabited
Parcel

In Seiber v. United States, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims found
that the presence of the northern spotted owl on private land did not
2 10
destroy all of the landowner's property rights to the inhabited parcel.
At the heart of the Seiber case were restrictions the Oregon Department
of Forestry placed on the Seibers' property to protect northern spotted
owls. 2 11 The department's regulations required seventy acres of land

around every nesting tree to be designated as nesting habitat and
prevented logging within these areas.21 2 In 1994, the State of Oregon
designated forty acres of the Seibers' property as nesting habitat.23 Five
years later, the Seibers sought to log the area and submitted an HCP and
an ITP application.21 4 The Department of the Interior's Regional
Solicitor informed the couple that their ITP application was not
adequate, offering to discuss modifications.2 5 The landowners rejected
this offer, and the FWS denied the application.21 6 The Seibers then
brought a takings action in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.21 7 Under
the court's order, the FWS visited the plaintiffs' property to evaluate the
status of the habitat 218 and determined that an ITP was no longer
required for the Seibers to log the property. 2 19 The plaintiffs pursued
their claim, arguing that the Service's denial of an ITP resulted in
regulatory and physical takings under various theories. 2
One theory the Seibers asserted was that the government's action of
prohibiting logging prevented them from excluding owls from the land
and therefore resulted in a per se physical taking.22 1 In rejecting this
claim, the court determined that the government's actions did not strip
210. 53 Fed. CI. 570, 576 (2002).
211. Id. at 572-74.
212. Id. at 572.
213. Id.
214. Id.

215. Id. at 573.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.

219. Id.
220. See id. at 573-74.
221. Id. at 575-76.
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the landowners of their fundamental property rights.222 First, the owls'
presence did not prevent the Seibers from possessing the land or
excluding others from it. 223 Second, the government's actions did not

take away the landowners' rights to control the property and put it 224
to
property.
the
logging
from
them
prevented
it
though
even
uses,
other
Thus, under Seiber, a landowner who retains his or her fundamental
property rights following a government
action under the ESA has not
225
suffered aper se physical taking.
In sum, although per se physical takings claims avoid several of the
procedural and substantive hurdles that regulatory takings claims face,
courts have consistently rejected them for two reasons. First, the
government does not control the location of wild animals protected by
federal statutes. Second, the presence of a protected species on private
land does not destroy all of a landowner's fundamental property rights.
V.

COMPENSABLE PHYSICAL INVASIONS UNDER THE ESA

The final type of takings claim is the compensable physical
invasion.226 Compensable physical invasion claims result from
temporary or intermittent invasions of private property caused by a
government action.227 These invasions limit a landowner's right 228
to
exclude but leave some or all of the other basic property rights intact.
A landowner may suffer a compensable physical invasion and still
possess the land, retain the ability to prevent others from possessing and
using it, and control its use and disposal. 29 Compensable physical
invasions are physical takings. 230 Thus, as with per se physical takings
claims, compensable physical invasion claims under the ESA avoid
several of the roadblocks faced by claims of regulatory takings. In
determining whether a physical invasion claim will receive
compensation, it is likely that a court will undertake the three-factor

222. Id. at 576.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See id at 576. The court did not discuss whether the government's actions prevented the
landowners from disposing of their land because the plaintiffs had not raised the claim. Id.
226. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 n.12 (1982).
227. See id
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
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balancing test the U.S. Supreme Court developed in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City.231 This test requires a court to
weigh the character of the government action, the effect of the action on
the landowner's reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the
action's economic impact on the landowner.232
A.

Compensable Physical Invasion Claims Under the ESA Avoid the
Roadblocks Facedby Regulatory Takings Claims

Compensable physical invasions are another type of physical
taking. 233 Consequently, landowners' claims of compensable physical
invasions have several of the same advantages over regulatory takings
claims as those enjoyed by per se physical takings claims.234 First,
compensable physical invasion claims are ripe as soon as the invasion
occurs. 235 Thus, a landowner may seek compensation from the federal
government without having completed the process of applying for an
HCP and ITP.236 Second, landowners may receive compensation for any
portion of property the government has occupied in the invasion,
regardless 7of whether this area is merely a small fraction of the total
23
property.
While per se physical takings and compensable physical invasions
share these two advantages over regulatory takings, there is one
advantage per se physical takings claims enjoy that compensable
physical invasion claims do not. Namely, courts do not consider the
investment-backed expectations when
reasonable
landowners'
evaluating per se takings claims.238 For compensable physical invasion
in
claims, however, these expectations are one factor the courts consider
239
compensation.
requires
invasion
physical
a
whether
determining

231. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432 (discussing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978)).
232. See Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124.
233. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 n.12.
234. See supra Part IV.A.
235. See, e.g., Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1402 (9th Cir.
1989) (stating that the "final decision requirement is inapplicable in cases of physical invasion");
see also Grant, supra note 8, at 733.
236. See Grant, supranote 8, at 733.
237. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 438 n.16.
238. See supra Part IV.A.
239. See infra Part V.B.
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Courts Consider Three Factors to Determine Whether a Physical
Invasion Requires Compensation

The Loretto Court explicitly excluded physical invasions from its rule
that permanent physical occupations of private land due to government
actions require compensation as per se physical takings.2 40 In dicta,
however, the Court suggested that lower courts use the Penn Central
balancing test to determine whether a compensable physical invasion has
occurred. 24 ' Under this test, courts weigh three major factors-the
character of the government action, the effect of the action on the
landowner's reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the
economic impact of the action on the landowner.24 2
1.

In Assessing the Characterof a GovernmentAction, Courts
Consider the Degree to Which the Action Allows Physical
Government Interference With PrivateProperty

To determine whether a government action resulting in a physical
invasion is compensable, courts first consider the character of the action
itself.243 In Penn Central,the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the primary
consideration courts are to make in evaluating the character of the
government action is whether the action is physical in nature.244 If the
action includes a physical invasion by the government, a court is more
likely to find the landowner has suffered a taking.245 One example of the
application of this factor is United States v. Causby.246 In Causby, the
U.S. Supreme Court concluded that government flights over private
property at low altitudes, which caused direct and immediate harm to the
landowners, were physical invasions of private property by the

240. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 n.12 ("The permanence and absolute exclusivity of a physical
occupation distinguish it from temporary limitations on the right to exclude. Not every physical
invasion is taking .... [T]emporary limitations are subject to a more complex balancing process to
determine whether they are a taking.") (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
241. See id. at 434-35.
242. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
243. Id.
244. See id. ("A 'taking' may more readily be found when the interference with property can be
characterized as a physical invasion by government ... than when interference arises from some
public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.")
(citation omitted).
245. Id.
246. 328 U.S. 256 (1946); see also Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (citing Causby).
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government2 4 7 Such actions therefore required compensation for a
taking.248 Thus, the more the action results in the physical presence of
the government on private land, the more likely a court is to find that the
landowner has suffered a taking.
2.

A Government Action Resulting in a PhysicalInvasion That
Destroys a Landowner'sReasonable Investment-Backed
ExpectationsRequires CompensationIf Those Expectations Were
Based on Assurances Providedby the Government

The second factor in the Penn Central balancing test is the effect of
the government action on the landowner's reasonable investment-backed
expectations. 249 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not explicitly
defined the term "investment-backed expectations, ' 25 it has considered
this factor in assessing a takings claim stemming from a physical
invasion in Kaiser Aetna v. United States.251 Thus, in Kaiser, the Court
set the parameters for applying a takings claim stemming from a
physical invasion.
In Kaiser, the Court determined that landowners' investment-backed
expectations for property are reasonable when they are based on
assurances provided by the government.2 52 If the government causes a
physical invasion that destroys these expectations, compensation is
due. 53 The dispute in Kaiser arose when the Army Corps of Engineers
granted a developer permission to dredge a navigable channel between
the Pacific Ocean and a formerly land-locked pond on Oahu, Hawaii as
54
part of an effort to create a marina-style community around the pond.
Eleven years later, after the marina was complete and Kaiser had spent
millions of dollars on the effort, the government claimed the public had
25
a right of access to the marina. 25 The government reasoned that, because
the marina was linked to navigable waters, it was subject to a

247. Causby, 328 U.S. at 264-67.
248. Id.
249. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124.
250. See supranotes 130-32 and accompanying text.
251. 444 U.S. 164, 180(1979).

252. Id. at 179.
253. Id. at 179-80.
254. Id. at 167.
255. Id. at 170.
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navigational servitude. 6 The United States brought an action against
Kaiser to resolve whether the corporation could deny the public access
to the marina in spite of Kaiser's past improvements that turned the
marina into navigable waters of the United States.257 The Court held that
the government's approval of the original marina project made the
corporation's expectation-that it would be able to exclude the public
from the marina-reasonable. 258 Subsequent government actions
asserting the public's right of access to the marina destroyed the
corporation's right to exclude the public from its property.2 1 9 This
combination-creating a property-expectancy and then destroying it by
requiring Kaiser to acquiesce to a physical invasion-required
compensation. 260
3.

A Government Action That Does Not Provide a Landowner With a
Mechanism to Control a PhysicalInvasion and Mitigate the
Invasion's Economic Impact May Require Compensation

The final factor in the Penn Central balancing test is the economic
impact of the government action.26' In PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins,262 the U.S. Supreme Court determined that, when considering
the economic impact of a physical invasion, courts should look to the
landowner's degree of control over the invasion.263 If the landowner had
an available mechanism with which to control the time, place, and
manner of the invasion in such a way as to reduce its economic impact,
courts are unlikely to award compensation.2 64
In PruneYard, the owners of a shopping center asserted that a
California Supreme Court decision requiring the center to allow students
onto their property to collect signatures effected a compensable physical
invasion.265 After students set up a booth on the center's property to
distribute literature and collect signatures in opposition to a United

256. Id.
257. Id. at 168-69.
258. Id. at 179.
259. Id. at 179-80.

260. Id.
261. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
262. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
263. See id. at 83-84.
264. See id.
265. Id. at 82.
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Nations resolution, they were ordered off the premises.266 The students
brought an action in California state court, arguing that it was a violation
of their First Amendment rights not to be able to solicit signatures on
PruneYard's property.267 The California Supreme Court held that the
state constitution protected "speech and petitioning, reasonably
exercised, in shopping centers even when the centers are privately
owned., 268 On review, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the California
Supreme Court's requirement that the students be allowed to exercise
protected free expression rights did not amount to a taking. 269 The Court
reasoned that the shopping center retained the ability, through the
enactment and enforcement of regulations, to restrict the "time, place,
and manner" in which the students could make public expressions within
the center.270 This control provided PruneYard's owners with a
mechanism through which to ensure that the students' presence would
have minimal economic effects on the center. 271 Thus, the Court
concluded that a compensable physical invasion had not occurred.27
VI. GOVERNMENT ACTIONS UNDER THE ESA DO NOT GIVE
RISE TO COMPENSABLE PHYSICAL INVASIONS
Compensable physical invasion claims are the only remaining
untested option for landowners seeking government compensation for a
taking under the ESA. Such claims present several advantages over
regulatory and per se physical takings claims.2 73 These advantages
suggest that compensable physical invasion claims are likely to be the
next type of claim advanced by landowners affected by the ESA.274
When faced with such a claim, courts should reject it for two reasons.
First, courts should find that the protection of wildlife on private land is
a background principle of property. 275 As such, government actions
implementing protections for wildlife on private land can never result in
266. Id. at 77.

267. Id.
268. Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979).
269. See PruneYard,447 U.S. at 83.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 84.
273. See infra Part VIA.
274. See infra Part VI.A.
275. See infra Part VI.B.
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takings. 276 Second, physical invasion claims under the ESA will most
likely fail each prong of the Penn Centralbalancing test.277
A.

Compensable PhysicalInvasion Claims Under the ESA Are Likely
To Be the Next Type of Claim Advanced By Landowners Affected
By the ESA

Courts' rejections of regulatory and per se physical takings claims
under the ESA suggest that landowners seeking compensation for
takings under the Act may be left with only one option-claims of
compensable physical invasions. 27 8 Although no court has decided such
a claim, there are three reasons why landowners are likely to raise them.
First, because compensable physical invasions are physical takings,27 9
landowners do not have to complete HCPs and have the Services take
final actions on the plans prior to bringing claims.28 ° Instead,
compensable physical invasion claims are ripe as soon as the physical
invasion occurs. 281 Second, as with per se physical takings, landowners
advancing compensable physical invasion claims may seek
compensation for any portion of their property affected by the
invasion. 282 Successful regulatory takings claims, on the other hand,
require that the government action affect the entire piece of land owned
by the claimant.283
Finally, compensable physical invasion claims do not require as
extensive an interference with private land as that required for successful
per se physical takings claims. A per se physical takings claim requires a
landowner to prove that a government action caused a permanent
physical occupation of his or her land by a listed species. A landowner
may assert a compensable physical invasion claim, on the other hand,
merely by showing that a government action limited his or her right to
exclude the species from the land. 285 Thus, an injunction or other

276. See infra Part VI.B.
277. See infra Part VI.C.
278. See supra Part V.A.

279. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
281. See Grant, supra note 8, at 733.
282. See Loretto Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 n.16 (1982).
283. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 158-64 and accompanying text.
285. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 n.12.

Physical Takings and the ESA
government action that prevents a landowner from taking actions to
exclude a listed species-such as fencing land or harvesting treestechnically may result in a physical invasion.2 86
B.

The ESA Enforces PreexistingLimitations on Landowners' Titles,
and Therefore Its Implementation Does Not Result in a
Compensable Physical Invasion

In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that laws that place limitations on a landowner's title never cause a
taking when the limitations are grounded in background principles of
property and nuisance.28 7 The common law, which defines these
background principles, provides that the state holds wildlife in trust for
the benefit of the public.

288

Commentators have asserted that limits on

the use of private land that are necessary to further the government's
interest in managing wildlife therefore constitute a background principle
of property. 289 As such, these limits do not give rise to takings. 290 Thus,

federal wildlife conservation statutes such as the ESA simply recognize
the government's ability to enforce preexisting limitations on a
landowner's title to protect wildlife.2 91 Claims of compensable physical
invasions under the ESA therefore should fail because the Act merely
enforces a limitation on a landowner's title that is rooted in background
principles of property.
C.

Claims of Compensable PhysicalInvasions Stemming from
Government Actions Implementing the ESA Fail the Penn Central
Balancing Test

If a court found that a government action under the ESA went beyond
simply implementing a preexisting limitation on the landowner's title, it
would consider the merits of the takings claim. No court has yet
considered a claim of a compensable physical invasion arising from a
government action under the Act. When such a claim arises, however, a
286. These situations are analogous to those in Kaiser and PruneYard, in which government
actions provided for the intermittent presence of boats and people, respectively, on private property.
See supra notes 254-55, 265-66 and accompanying text.
287. 505 U.S. 1003, 1028-29 (1992).
288. See Houck, supra note 43, at 308-09.
289. See, e.g., Sugameli, supranote 7, at 443; Houck, supra note 43, at 308-21.
290. See Sugameli, supra note 7, at 443.
291. See id.; Houck, supra note 43, at 320.
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court should apply the Penn Central three-factor balancing test. This test
is appropriate because in Loretto, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that
physical invasion takings claims are subject to a "complex balancing
process. 2 92 The Court then referenced the Kaiser and PruneYard
decisions, both of which used the Penn Central test, as examples of the
Court's application of this balancing process to such claims.293 A
consideration of the Penn Central decision in light of legal precedents
and the ESA's statutory safeguards strongly suggests that courts should
reject these claims.
1.

GovernmentActions Under the ESA Are Not of the Character
Necessary to Support Claims of Compensable PhysicalInvasions
Because They Do Not Providefor a Physical Government Presence
on PrivateLand

Actions the Services take to enforce the ESA do not provide for a
physical government presence on private land and therefore are not of
the character necessary to support claims of compensable physical
invasions. Under the U.S. Supreme Court's standard for determining
whether the character of a government action bolsters such claims, a
court must consider the extent to which the action results in the
government's physical presence on private land.294 In Mountain States,
Christy, and Boise, three different circuit courts determined that
federally-protected species are not agents of the government, 295 and thus
government actions to enforce the ESA do not result in a physical
government presence on private land. Actions under the ESA requiring
landowners to allow listed species onto private land therefore do not
result in a physical governmental presence on the land.

292. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,435 n.12 (1982).
293. Id.
294. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see also supra Part
V.B.I.
295. See Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 123 S.Ct. 1484 (2003); Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1335 (9th Cir. 1988); Mountain
States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423, 1426-27 (10th Cir. 1986).

Physical Takings and the ESA
2.

Notification Requirementsfor Listing Decisions and Section 7
ConsultationRequirements Preclude Claims That Government
Actions Interfere with Landowners' Reasonable Investment-Backed
Expectations

Even if a court found that the government controlled a listed species,
and that the species' inhabitance of private land comprised a government
presence on the property, a claim that such a presence is compensable
should still fail. Applying the other two factors in the Penn Central test
should lead a court to find that such invasions do not require
compensation. The second factor in this test is the landowner's
reasonable investment-backed expectations. Reasonable investmentbacked expectations are crystallized expectations a landowner holds for
the continued use of his or her land in a certain manner.2 96 In Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court established that
compensation for a taking is due to landowners who base their
investment-backed expectations on government assurances and then
have those expectations destroyed by government-authorized physical
invasions.29 7 Sections 4 and 7 of the ESA protect against such an
occurrence by requiring the Services to provide landowners with notice
of listing events 298 and consult with agencies that undertake or authorize
activities on private land that may affect listed species.2 99
The notice requirement of Section 4 should ensure that, once a species
is listed, the investment-backed expectations landowners hold for private
property are "reasonable." Under Section 4, landowners who may be
affected by a listing receive notice that either the FWS or NOAA
Fisheries has listed a species or designated critical habitat.300 Once
notified, landowners can no longer modify the species' habitat located
on their property without an approved HCP and thus must incorporate
these prohibitions into their investment-backed expectations.301
Landowners' expectations that they will be able to take any actions on
their land, regardless of the impact the actions have on the listed species,
therefore is no longer reasonable after notice has been given. For
296. See Michelman, supra note 131, at 1233.
297. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979); see also supra Part V.B.2.

298. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(ii), (b)(5) (2000); see also LISTING A SPECIES, supra note 39, at
2.
299. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
300. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(ii), (b)(5); see also LISTING A SPECIES, supra note 39, at 2.
301. See 16 U.S.C § 1538(a)(l)(B).
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example, in Boise, the landowner knew that the northern spotted owl
was listed as threatened and that habitat for the species was present on
the property prior to the landowner's initiation of efforts to log the
site. 30 2 A court therefore should find such a landowner's expectation that
it would be able to log freely without obtaining an ITP to be
unreasonable.
The Section 7 consultation requirement presents another roadblock to
landowners' assertions that government actions, which result in physical
invasions of private property, destroy their reasonable investmentbacked expectations. This Section requires federal agencies to consult
with the FWS or NOAA Fisheries to ensure that actions they authorize,
fund, or carry out will be unlikely to either jeopardize the existence of
any listed species or destroy or adversely modify critical habitat.30 3
Thus, any agency that provides a landowner with approval of a project
on private land must first establish that the project will not harm a listed
species or its habitat.30 4 This requirement should prevent situations such
as that in Kaiser, in which an agency provided a landowner with
assurances and then destroyed those assurances by requiring the
landowner to submit to a physical invasion.30 5
3.

The Availability ofITPs Under the ESA Mitigates the Economic
Impact of the Government's Actions on Landowners

Landowners' claims of compensable physical invasions under the
ESA also fail the third prong in the Penn Central balancing test. In
PruneYard, the U.S. Supreme Court established that landowners who
have a mechanism to mitigate the economic effects of a government
invasion by controlling its time, place, and manner should not receive
The ESA's ITP provision grants
compensation for a physical invasion.306
30 7
landowners such a mechanism.
Section 10's ITP provision provides private landowners affected by
the Act with a mechanism through which they can mitigate the economic
effects of the government's action. 3 0 8 This provision allows landowners
302. Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1341-42 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
303. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).

304. Id; see also supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 252-60 and accompanying text.
306. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980).
307. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
308. See id.; see also supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
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to develop and submit an HCP for their land. If the FWS or NOAA
Fisheries accepts the plan, landowners may receive an ITP to "take"
individuals of a listed species or harvest segments of critical habitat.30 9
Under this process, landowners can determine the sections of property
that are most economically valuable and seek an ITP to harvest them.3 1°
By allowing landowners to propose areas of habitat to protect and areas
to eliminate, the habitat conservation planning process also gives
landowners some control over where a listed species may reside on their
property. If the FWS determines that the landowner has taken adequate
measures to mitigate for the destruction of habitat, and for the possible
take of individual owls, it will grant an ITP and allow him or her to
proceed. 3 ' While the HCP development process can have significant
costs,"' receiving an ITP should provide landowners with the same
ability to mitigate the economic effects of maintaining suitable habitat
for listed species on their land as that enjoyed by the landowners in
3
PruneYard. 13
The Boise case illustrates the difficulty landowners would face in
presenting a convincing case that the government's actions under the
ESA had an economic impact severe enough to warrant compensation as
a physical invasion. Boise did not file an application for an ITP until the
federal district court enjoined the corporation from logging without
one. 3 14 Thus, Boise had not used the available mechanisms to reduce the
economic impact of the ESA on its land. This omission would make it
difficult, if not impossible, for the corporation to claim that the
government's actions implementing the Act on its land resulted in a
compensable economic impact. Had Boise applied for an ITP at the
outset, it could have proposed a mitigation plan, such as undertaking
limited logging in the area inhabited by the owl in return for preserving
habitat elsewhere on its property.

309. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a); see also supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
310. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a); see also supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.

311. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a); see also supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
312. See Robin L. Rivett, Why There Are So Few Takings Cases Under the Endangered Species
Act or Some Major Obstacles to Takings Liabilities, SC43 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 383, 394 (1998).
313. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980).

314. Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Given the failure of regulatory and per se physical takings claims in
the courts, it is likely that landowners affected by the ESA will soon turn
to compensable physical invasion claims. When such claims are
presented, courts should reject them. Existing precedent and statutory
safeguards in the ESA make it difficult, if not impossible, for private
landowners to argue successfully that any of the three factors in the Penn
Centralbalancing test rise to the level of requiring compensation for a
physical invasion. The Act's protection of imperiled species does not
come at the expense of private landowners' fundamental property rights.
Thus, courts should reject landowners' claims that ESA restrictions
result in compensable physical invasions.

